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Abstract It is shown that Vygotsky's concept of culture was co-
determined by two fundamental traditions in the human
sciences. The first tradition was initiated by Humboldt and
exerted a powerful influence on Vygotsky's thinking through the
works of Potebnya and Shpet. Vygotsky's thinking about
linguistic mediation was to a large extent determined by this
tradition. The second tradition was that of Marxism and
progressive thought and influenced Vygotsky's thinking about
such notions as tool-use and social and cultural progress. The
way in which Vygotsky combined these different perspectives in
his concept of culture is described. It is suggested that this
concept of culture was powerful but also limited and biased.
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The Concept of Culture in
Vygotsky's Thinking
According to ancient tradition tool and language belong to what is most
human in man. (Bühler, 1934, p. iii)
No experience in my exotic wanderings among the Trobianders and the
Chagga, among the Masai and the Pueblo, has ever matched the shock I
received on my first visit to New York, when I arrived there ten years ago on
a fine spring evening, and saw the city in its strangeness and exotic beauty.
The enormous yet elegant monsters blinking at me through their thousand
starry eyes, breathing white steam, giants which crowded in fantastic
clusters over the smooth waters of the river, stood before me: the living,
dominating realities of this new culture. During my first few days in New
York I could not shake off the feeling that the strange 'genius' of this most
modern civilization had become incarnate in the skyscraper, the subway,
and the ferry boat. Large insects in the shape of automobiles crept along the
gutter called street or avenue, subordinate but important. Finally, as a fairly
insignificant and secondary by-product of the enormous mechanical reality,
there appeared the microscopic bacteria called Man, sneaking in and out of
subway, skyscraper, or automobile, performing some useful service to their
masters, but otherwise rather insignificant. Modem civilization is a gigantic
hypertrophy of material objects, and contemporary man will still have to
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fight his battle in order to reassert his dominance over the Thing. (Mali-
nowski, 1937, pp. 145-146)
To discuss the concept of culture in Vygotsky's cultural-historical
theory is to go back in time, to examine his views and to try to trace the
roots of his ideas in those of his contemporaries and predecessors. It
will be seen, I believe, that although the man Vygotsky was a person of
immense erudition, an expert in religious, philosophical and psycho-
logical thought, a lecturer who could speak fluently about musical
composers and Einstein's theory of relativity, a connoisseur of lit-
erature, drama, poetry and an amateur poet himself, the researcher
Vygotsky employed a rather limited concept of culture in his theoret-
ical thinking.
Elsewhere (e.g. Van der Veer, 1991; Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991 ) it
has been pointed out that Vygotsky's thinking about culture and its
part in mental functioning was influenced by his reading of important
German theorists such as Werner (1925), Krueger (1915) and Thurn-
wald (1922, cf. 1938) and by the writings of the French sociological
school of Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl and their followers in psychology,
such as Janet and Blondel. Little attention has been given to another
tradition in psychology which finally led to Wundt's Völkerpsychologie
(Jahoda, 1982, 1995; Valsiner & Van der Veer, 1995). Meanwhile it can
be argued that this tradition which starts with Humboldt and leads
through Steinthal and Lazarus to Wundt and others formed quite an
important background for Vygotsky's whole project. It may be
assumed that Vygotsky digested this tradition primarily through the
writings of two important Russians scholars with whose work he was
thoroughly acquainted. In what follows I give a brief account of some
of the relevant ideas of these thinkers. I then briefly comment upon
several other notions that Vygotsky used in his cultural-historical
theory and, finally, draw some conclusions as to the concept of culture
implicit in this theory.
From Humboldt to Potebnya
It is well known (cf. Levitin, 1990) that one of the first scholars who
prompted Vygotsky's interest in psychology was Aleksandr Potebnya
(1835-91), a linguist who worked in the tradition of Humboldt (Salus,
1969) and who saw the study of language as being of the utmost
importance for all psychology. In Potebnya's view, language or articu-
late speech not only serves as a means of communication but shapes
our whole way of thinking (Budagov, 1988). In his view the language
we are born into is by far the most important part of our cultural and
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biological heritage. Without verbal concepts no science would be
possible, and without words as internal means humans would have
remained savages, because words are 'the first and fundamental
means of progress' (Potebnya, 1926/1989a, pp. 181,197-198).
One of Potebnya's main themes was that of the relation between
words or concepts, on the one hand, and ideas or thoughts, on the
other hand. Throughout his book, Thought and Language, Potebnya (e.g.
1926/1989a, pp. 28, 39, 148, 156, 169) argued in the tradition of
Humboldt that ideas are not simply expressed in words (as if ideas lie
ready-made in our mind and only need to be stated aloud) but are
born together with the word. Language or speech adds something to
the idea; it is an instrument that creates or shapes our ideas, or, as
Humboldt expressed it, it is the creative organ of thought ('das
bildende Organ des Gedanken'). This is not to say that forms of non-
verbal thought do not exist. Potebnya (1926/1989a, pp. 50-51) pointed
out that pre-verbal children can solve certain practical problems and
that artists may use forms of non-verbal thought. But it does mean that
speech, the articulation of ideas, changes these ideas in certain funda-
mental ways.
Potebnya argued that what language does is to objectify one's
private ideas. This has several interconnected repercussions. First, by
stating one's ideas in the language of some culture, they become
accessible to the whole community and thereby stop being one's
private ideas. Or, in Potebnya's (1926/1989a, p. 166) own words, the
idea stated in words 'stops being the property of the speaker himself
and gets the possibility of a life independent of its creator'. In modem
terms, this is to say that the formulation of an idea allows it to leave the
realm of private thought and makes it possible for the idea to enter
Popper's World 3, that is, the world of ideas in the objective sense, the
world of theories (Popper, 1972), where it can be criticized, changed,
etc.
Second, if I wish to communicate my ideas I must necessarily make
use of the existing words of the language of my own or some other
culture. As Potebnya (1926/1989a, p. 42) said, after Humboldt, we are
confined within the boundaries of our language and we can only step
out of it by stepping into another language. This means that we are
forced to use the heritage of the past embodied in the language of our
culture (p. 128). Words necessarily generalize, that is, they refer to a
whole class of similar events or objects (pp. 138-139), and by describ-
ing my ideas in existing words I necessarily make my private ideas
comparable to the existing ideas, events, etc., of that culture and
thereby objectify them (cf. Bühler, 1934; Stern & Stem, 1928). In other
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words, to speak, as Humboldt said, is to connect one's own special
ideas with the existing ideas ('Sprechen heißt sein besonderes Denken
an das Allgemeine anknüpfen'; Potebnya, 1926/1989a, p. 149).
Third, once I have given form to my idea in words it becomes an
object for myself as words are audible and in this way are returned to
the speaker (Potebnya, 1926/1989a, pp. 40, 133). By stating a certain
idea to a listener 1 not only communicate that idea to the listener but
make it audible for myself and thereby influence myself. In this
connection Potebnya pointed out a phenomenon well known to
teachers, that is, that it is sometimes only in explaining a topic to the
students that the teacher realizes that he does not understand the topic
himself. The reason is that in explaining something to another 1 also
explain it to myself (docendo discimus). Again, this was a theme first
developed by Humboldt, who had argued (Potebnya, 1926/1989a, pp.
40, 95, 131) that man understands himself only when he has tried the
intelligibility of his words upon the social other. This led Potebnya (p.
127) to state that the word is as much a means to understand the other
as it is a means to understand oneself. Articulate speech or language,
then, is a means to understand oneself due to the fact that it is returned
to its source as an object (p. 133).
In Potebnya's conception, language is essential to objectify our ideas
and to make scientific discourse possible. It is also indispensable for
most of the thinking of the individual person, as most thinking is
dependent upon concepts which are tied to language. Potebnya (pp.
40, 146) claimed that language is essential for the thinking of the
individual person 'even if he is completely isolated'. The articulate
nature (drobnost") of language, the discursivity of thought prescribed
by language, create a structured world whose boundaries we cannot
transcend once we have stepped into it (p. 152). But this structured
world comes about in the constant dialogue between speaker and
listener who never fully understand each other because no one thinks
of exactly the same thing when using a certain word (p. 166), a theme
which must have appealed to Bakhtin (see Clark & Holquist, 1984, p.
65). As soon as the words are uttered they become the shared property
of speaker and listener ('the speaker, feeling that the word belongs to
him, at the same time assumes that the word and the idea do not form
his exclusive, personal possession, because what the listener under-
stands belongs, consequently, also to the latter', Potebnya, 1926/1989a,
p. 156). Fortunately, shared understanding is possible because both
speaker and listener refer to certain objects existing 'out there' (pp. 45,
124).
These are interesting ideas which deserve a more complete descrip-
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tion and analysis than can be given in the context of this paper. But
even a superficial listing of several of Potebnya's key ideas makes
it abundantly clear that he must have been read by Vygotsky with
more than usual interest. Indeed, the whole spirit of Potebnya's
(1910/1989b, 1926/1989a) writings (which were filled with psycho-
logical examples), his central ideas and many specific remarks are
surprisingly similar to ideas we have met in Vygotsky's work. I will
mention but a few of them.
(1) The relationship between speech and thinking is, of course, one
of the few central themes in Vygotsky's whole body of writings (cf. the
different papers gathered in Thought and Language, 1934/1962). It is
quite clear that Vygotsky shared Potebnya's general view that lan-
guage or speech shapes our mental processes in fundamental ways.
With Potebnya he was inclined to regard the linguistic tools we inherit
from our culture as being of the utmost importance, and like Potebnya
he regarded the word as a tool of progress without which no progress
and no civilized life would be possible.
(2) More specifically, Vygotsky investigated the different roots of
discursive thinking. He adopted Potebnya's view that thought and
speech are in principle separable and that non-verbal forms of thought
can be found. To Potebnya's ontogenetic example (pre-verbal thought
in infants) he added phylogenetic evidence (the practical intelligence
of Köhler" s [1921] chimpanzees seemed to suggest that the common
ancestors of ape and human had rudimentary intelligence without
speech). Vygotsky (1929a) also added the argument that there is
something like pre-intellectual speech (the vocalizing of infants) and
concluded that thinking and speech have different genetic roots. The
merging of practical thinking with speech leads to verbal, discursive
thinking, which is a fundamentally new phenomenon. In this connec-
tion, Vygotsky many times approvingly quoted Potebnya's statement
that ideas are not expressed but born in language.
(3) Vygotsky repeatedly argued that by using concepts we not only
communicate with others (obshcheme) but also generalize (obobshchenie).
A substantial part of his research was dedicated to the investigation of
concept formation in children and in this connection he showed that at
different age levels the words children use mean different things but
that genuine communication is fortunately possible because of the joint
reference class. He argued that one of the fundamental advantages of
the use of academic concepts is that they form part of a system of
interconnected concepts which allows the subject to link up with exist-
ing knowledge and to draw conclusions based upon this system.




that words are 'reversible stimuli', that is, they are heard by the
speaker him- or herself. In 'Consciousness as a Problem for the
Psychology of Behavior1 (Vygotsky, 1925/1996), for example, he dealt
with this issue in reflexological terms and stated that words are
reversible reflexes which lie at the basis of consciousness. The uttered
word (a reflex or response) is returned to the speaker (as a stimulus)
for further processing (conscious reflection). In this connection,
Vygotsky argued that in deaf-mutes vocal speech remains unconscious
and non-social as the 'reversibility of the speech reflex is paralyzed by
the absence of hearing'. More generally, he defended the view that we
are conscious of ourselves 'only to the extent that we are others to
ourselves, i.e., to the extent that we can again perceive our own
reflexes as stimuli'. It is a view that comes close to some of the ideas of
Royce, Baldwin, Mead and (through Baldwin) Janet and that is in the
spirit of Humboldt's famous antinomies: is only by operating upon the
social other (by speaking) and by becoming a social other to some
extent (through the use of accepted terminology etc.) that we can
become our own conscious selves (through reflection upon our own
utterances, the effects they produced, etc.).
These few remarks make it quite clear that Vygotsky was probably
directly inspired by Potebnya (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991) and
that he at any rate must have read Potebnya with great enthusiasm
The common general themes I have pointed out (and many more
minor similarities could be given) allow one to conclude that Vygotsky
can be firmly placed in the tradition of Potebnya and (to the extent that
Potebnya was 'merely' elaborating and extending Humboldt's ideas)
Wilhelm von Humboldt.
Shpet's Semiotic Approach
The possible influence of another Humboldtian scholar, Gustav Shpet
(1879-1937), on Vygotsky's thinking also remains largely unanalysed
(cf. Zinchenko & Morgunov, 1994). We know (Van der Veer & Valsiner,
1991) that Vygotsky as a student followed a course given by Shpet on
the 'inner form' of the word (a topic adopted from Humboldt that
Potebnya also dealt with), and we may assume that he kept following
Shpet's theorizing with some interest. Part of Shpet's thinking resulted
in a book which must have been highly relevant for Vygotsky's own
endeavour, Shpet's (1927/1989) Introduction to Ethnic Psychology.
Shpet's book was an elaborate critique of Lazarus's and Steinthal's
views of what they called Völkerpsychologie. Shpet examined what the
topic of such a science might be, what its principal views were, and
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how it was related to kindred disciplines such as ethnology and
psychology. He was critical of Lazarus's and Steinthal's attempts (see
Jahoda, 1995) to delineate the area of ethnic psychology or ethno-
psychology (Shpet's translation of Völkerpsychologie), and even more so
of Wundt's subsequent attempts to define this field. Wundt's attempt
to define ethnopsychology as a science that studies mental products
('geistige Erzeugnisse') he contested by arguing that very many things
(the Eiffel Tower, paintings, religious beliefs, etc.) are mental products
but that these qua objective entities are nevertheless studied by other
sciences (Shpet, 1927/1989, p. 504). Here he agreed with Durkheim's
(1937/1977, p. 15) similar contention that social facts should be
considered as things ('de considérer les faits sociaux commes des
choses') that have an objective existence and need to be studied as such
by other sciences than psychology, such as sociology, history, etc. At
any rate, Shpet argued, the fact that something is a product of mind
does not make it necessarily a part of the subject-matter of psychology.
Shpet's own view was that ethnopsychology rested upon
... the understanding of some system of signs, consequently, its subject-
matter is understood only through the deciphering and interpretation of
these signs. That these signs are not merely features of things but also
communications about them is obvious from the fact that the existence of the
corresponding things is not confined to the pure phenomenon of signs. In
other words, we are dealing with signs which do not only refer to things but
also express some meaning. To show in what this meaning resides is nothing
other than to reveal the corresponding subject with its content, i.e., in our
case it is the path to a precise fixation of the subject-matter of ethnic
psychology. (Shpet, 1927/1989, p. 514)
Shpet hastened to add that this preliminary delineation of the area of
ethnopsychology did not yet achieve very much. He argued, for
instance, that these meanings do not necessarily have to be psycho-
logical. He then went on to argue that ethnopsychology cannot study
social phenomena because the goal of scientific analysis is to analyse a
compound into elements which retain the specificity of the phenom-
enon, that is, in the case of the social the elements must be social, and
not psychological or biological. One cannot, therefore, reduce social or
cultural phenomena to psychological ones. What is left, then, for
ethnopsychology? In Shpet's (1927/1989, pp. 547-565) view, it was the
description of how primitive or modern man experiences objective
social phenomena such as language, religion etc. At the basis of such a
science is semiotics (semasiology), which enables us to interpret the
objective (mostly language-based) signs and meanings which the
subject experiences in a given culture.
253
Culture & Psychology
This certainly is still a long way from Vygotsky's conception of
semiotic mediation, but one can nevertheless see interesting parallels
in the emphasis on signs and meanings in psychological functioning.
Shpet's claim that semiotics should be at the basis of (ethno)psychol-
ogy certainly must have appealed to Vygotsky.
We may conclude, then, that the reading of both Potebnya and Shpet
made Vygotsky very sensitive to the role of signs, language and speech
in psychological functioning. The picture that results from Potebnya's
and Shpet's theories is that of the human being who is being moulded
by the language he or she speaks. The classification of the world into
different categories, the forms our thinking takes, the unique way in
which we influence ourselves by speaking, the social origin of con-
sciousness in speech, the conception of human beings as being influ-
enced by the objective signs existing in some culture, etc., it was all to
be found in some form in Potebnya's and Shpet's psycholinguistic
writings. What remained was to fill in their ideas with concrete
psychological material and to conceive a coherent psychological
theory. History, however, decided otherwise.
From Linguistics to Practice and Psychology
The October Revolution of 1917 meant the start of a gradual but
inevitable change of the agenda of scientific psychology in what now
became the Soviet Union. Non-materialist pre-revolutionary thinkers
such as Potebnya and Shpet were now deemed obsolete and idealist
and different concepts such as 'labour', 'tool' and 'social progress'
were advanced by the leading ideologists and philosophers as the
central concepts of the humanities and social sciences (Van der Veer,
1991). We do not know what happened in Vygotsky's mind around the
revolution, but it is tempting to assume that the mature Vygotsky
(who had been an ardent 'idealisf in his youth) tried to merge the
older linguistic, idealist strand taken from Potebnya and Shpet with
the newer Marxist, practical strand into a mature scientific psychology,
just like he thought of mature adult thinking as having its generic roots
in both language and practical thought. In this connection, the Marxist
emphasis on the notion of human beings as tool-making and tool-
using animals, the idea of a fundamental difference between human
beings and animals, and the notion of the possibility of social and
cultural progress were most important.
The emphasis on tools led Vygotsky to follow the research carried
out by Köhler and the discussions it elicited (between people like Karl
Bühler, Kurt Koffka, Otto Selz and others) with great fascination and to
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discuss it at length in many papers. In the end he concluded that
chimpanzees and several lower species can make and use artifacts but
that these do not—as is the case for human beings—fundamentally
restructure their way of life.
Linked with the issue of tool-use was the issue of speech, if only
because Engels (see Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991) had argued that the
development of tool-use (and the ensuing development of labour)
inevitably led to the development of speech. In addition, many
thinkers had argued that speech was some kind of tool or instrument
for thought and that speech was unique to human beings. In this
connection, Vygotsky often approvingly quoted Köhler (1921, p. 192),
who had remarked that chimpanzees, despite their problem-solving
abilities and frequent tool-use, 'do not even develop the rudiments of
culture as they lack the priceless technical means of speech'. The
research by Yerkes and others seemed to confirm that higher apes
indeed lack the ability to acquire speech.
The resulting picture was as follows: the fundamental difference
between animals and human beings is that the latter develop labour
(tool-use) and speech. Speech is an essential prerequisite for culture in
that it allows us to acquire, preserve and transmit the products of
culture. But speech is like a two-edged sword: on the one hand, it is
directed outwards and allows us to distinguish the world into different
conceptual categories, etc.; on the other hand, for individuals it is
directed inward and forces them to see the world in terms of exactly
these categories. Another way of putting it is to say that by means of
words we can act upon other people and the things that surround us
but that by doing so we are at the same time acting upon ourselves (cf.
Cole, 1995).
That leaves the notion of social and cultural progress, which was
actively promoted by the Soviet Marxists of the 1920s. One can check
whether something like social or cultural progress is possible only by
comparing different cultures or different periods ('stages') within a
single culture. Here Vygotsky's primary sources for theoretical argu-
ments were the anthropological writings of Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl and
Thurnwald and the discussions around their work (see Van der Veer &
Valsiner, 1991). In discussing their findings and theories Vygotsky
concentrated upon such things as writing systems, counting pro-
cedures and conceptual development. He had no problem in arguing
that current writing systems are more flexible than older, pictorial
systems and that modern counting procedures are more powerful than
the classic ones which involve the use of body parts. He also claimed
that some primitive people might habitually use a form of conceptual
255
Culture & Psychology
thinking (using family concepts) which in western culture is less wide-
spread and that is regarded as a stage in the ontogeny of conceptual
thinking that is ordinarily overcome to a quite considerable degree.
The trend that Vygotsky observed in the history of humankind was
that of a decreasing reliance on material mediational means and an
increasing use of abstract, de-contextualized words not tied to specific
objects A very similar trend had been discussed by Potebnya, who
often showed that words lose their concrete material meaning as they
grow older and are used by many generations of people. For example,
the original word for two in some culture might be 'horns' because
animals tend to have two horns. Gradually, however, this concrete
meaning of the word will wear away, and the word will be less and
less tied to a concrete object or image and only its abstract meaning of
'two-ness' will remain. This whole process is quite similar, of course, to
the process of de-contexualization which has so often been discussed
by Wertsch (e.g. 1985) and others.
It is also interesting to see which cultural phenomenon described by
his immediate sources Vygotsky chose not to discuss. It is quite clear
that in dealing with the psychological significance of cultural objects
he did not include the full range of cultural phenomena that was
analysed by his contemporary ethnographers. Thumwald, Durkheim
and others investigated different systems of law, moral thinking,
religion, art, kinship systems, etc., but Vygotsky chose to concentrate
upon counting, writing and language (speech in his terms) at large.
Counting and speech in general served to illustrate the phenomenon
which Vygotsky posited as a general law, that is, that psychological
functions are first carried out with the help of external mediators and
only subsequently by means of internal mediators. Writing, counting
and speech all illustrated another fundamental aspect underlined by
Vygotsky, that is, that language-based tools 'backfire', that is, serve to
influence the inner world of the subject. Finally, writing and counting
systems can be seen as milestones in the historical development of
mankind and from a certain point of view they can be seen as
testifying of the progress of mankind and human culture. Selecting
these aspects of culture thus nicely fitted in with the dominant Soviet
theme of social and cultural progress. The other, equally language-
based, cultural phenomena dealt with by the professional cultural
anthropologists of his time were probably ignored by Vygotsky
because they were less fit to illustrate the three phenomena (the
external-internal mediation transition, the 'backfire' phenomenon and
the notion of progress) just listed.
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Comparing Cultures
However, by emphasizing those selected aspects of culture that from
some (debatable) point of view can be seen as displaying progress
Vygotsky introduced the notions of progress and hierarchy in the
comparison of culture. There is no doubt that he and his closest
collaborator Luria, just like many of their contemporaries, thought that
different cultures can be ordered in a developmental hierarchy with
the European type of culture at the top. In a paper on the problem of
the education of national minorities, for instance, Vygotsky argued
that the level of their cultures was 'low' and that they needed a 'forced
cultural development' in order to 'take a grandiose leap on the ladder
of their cultural development' and to reach the level of the 'unified
socialist culture' (Vygotsky, 1929b). These statements clearly indicate
that Vygotsky was of the opinion that the national minorities were still
enjoying a backward culture of a type that we westerners had long left
behind. In fact, his thinking in this domain closely paralleled his
thinking in the domain of what was called 'defectology'. Following
Petrova (1925), Vygotsky distinguished between problematic children
with some organic problem and 'primitive' children who were basi-
cally lacking a repertoire of abstract, de-contextualized cognitive skills.
The latter could be raised to the required level of abstract thinking
through education.
Basically the same attitude is noticeable in the writings of Luria of
that period. Talking about his fieldwork in Uzbekistan, Luria (1931)
mentions the need to raise the cultural level of a population that is still
backward culturally. Several years later, in discussing the results of his
second stay in Uzbekistan, Luria (1934) still regarded Uzbekistan as a
'primitive' society and he explicitly used the term 'levels of cultural
development'. In fact, it was only in the 1970s, when Luria discussed
the fieldwork in Uzbekistan in his intellectual biography, that we sud-
denly learned that Uzbek culture was not uniform and that Uzbekistan
'could [also] boast of an ancient high culture which included the
outstanding scientific and poetic achievements associated with such
figures as Uleg Bek, a mathematician and astronomer ... the philoso-
pher Al-Buruni, the physician Ali-ibn-Senna (Avecenna), the poets
Saadi and Nezami, and others'. Luria now attributed the formerly low
cultural level of the 'peasant masses' to the fact that they were being
exploited by feudal lords, while the Uzbek women were kept isolated
under the influence of 'the conservative teachings of the Islamic
religion' (Luria, 1979, pp. 60-61). We have clear indications, then, that
both Vygotsky and Luria were inclined to globally rank-order cultures
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on a ladder of cultural development and to regard contemporary non-
western cultures as relics of the past (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991).
The dominant notion of social and cultural progress (characteristic
of the mentality at the beginning of this century) and the equation of
social and cultural progress with the invention of new technology is
also nicely illustrated by the following enthusiastic lines about Amer-
ica written by Luria to his relatives in the late 1920s:
America is a country with an exceptionally high culture. The Americans
have amazingly polished roads from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean, lots of
cars, radios which make an astoundingly soft sound, hot and cold water in
each of the country's houses, marvelous eternal pens which made me forget
the simple ink-pot and ideal statistical machines. (Letter from Boston dated
25 September 1929; see Luna, 1994, p. 53)
These lines now seem terribly naive and to testify to a belief in
technology and human beings' 'dominance over the Thing' which
many people lost after World War II, the growing consciousness of
environmental pollution (cf. Shi-xu, 1995), etc. Indeed, it seems as if
Luria equated 'an exceptionally high culture' with 'lots of cars, radios
. . . and ideal statistical machines'. This is very significant because
Luria, just like Vygotsky, was a person who was exquisitely aware of
other aspects of culture, such as literature, religion, morals, etc., etc.
The fact that he chose the mentioned features of American culture to
illustrate its superiority once again testifies to the fact that both he and
Vygotsky shared a belief in technology and the promise it held for
cultural and social progress that was characteristic of the 1920s but that
is no longer universally held. In this respect, Malinowski's words,
given as an epigraph to this paper and written less than a decade after
Luria's observation, form a striking contrast. In fact, the difference
between Luria's naive designation of American culture ('lots of cars,
radios') and Malinowski's uncanny description ('gigantic hypertrophy
of material objects') is so immense that, retrospectively, one would
almost be tempted to follow Vygotsky's and Luria's example and
interpret this difference in developmental terms.
Culture and Word Meanings
For Vygotsky human history was, on the one hand, the history of
western man's growing dominion over nature through the invention
of tools and the perfection of technology, but, on the other hand, it was
also the history of man's gradual mastery of the self through the
invention and use of 'the cultural technique of signs' (Vygotsky, 1928,
p. 76). One could thus see progress in two respects: (a) through
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superior domination of nature through ever better technology; and (b)
through improved mastery of the self through 'psychotechnology7.
Being primarily interested in the working of the mind, Vygotsky felt
much more attracted to the field of psychotechnology, that is, the ways
signs can be used to improve the mastery of the self and the self's
understanding of the world. Through his reading of Potebnya and
Shpet he was inclined to regard words as the key tool for individual
functioning, as the 'first and fundamental means of progress'. In the
end his primary interest was and remained 'what words do to our
mind', and one can trace powerful influences of the Humboldtian
tradition in his thinking up to his final writings. This interest led him
to concentrate upon signs and meanings and upon the way environ-
mental events are conceptualized by the child or adult, rather than
upon the significance of environmental events as such.
Vygotsky's interest in the things words do to our mind also made
him less of a Marxist than was demanded at that time. Elsewhere (Van
der Veer & Valsiner, 1991) we have shown that Vygotsky's Soviet
contemporaries somehow sensed that his thinking was alien to the
prevailing ideology and that such researchers as Leont'ev criticized
Vygotsky for his exclusive devotion to the issue of word meaning,
which in Vygotsky's thinking seemed unconnected with material
reality. Leont'ev (1935/1983, pp. 70-73), for example, listed the results
of Vygotsky's research into the role of word meanings in child
development and then went on to argue that the views of his former
colleagues were in need of critique. We should not think that the
development of word meanings in the child is determined by the
cultural meanings it acquires and that the child in its turn can influence
cultural meanings. Neither the growth of culture nor the development
of the child can be viewed as solely depending upon the interaction of
subjects. This would, in Leont'ev's view, be highly similar to the
erroneous views of the French sociological school. What was lacking in
such a view—in addition to the interacting subjects or the subject
interacting with his or her culture—was a third factor, namely material
reality itself. Leont'ev argued that the evolution of word meanings
should not be seen 'as based upon the evolution of the word itself or
upon social interaction viewed in isolation and abstractly, but as based
upon the changing relationships between man and nature, upon the
emergence and development of labour and societal relationships'. It is
as if Leont'ev was saying here that Vygotsky was still primarily
thinking along the lines of the Humboldt-Potebnya-Shpet paradigm
and largely ignored the social or societal (e.g. social class) and material
aspects of culture. It is as if these critics claimed that Vygotsky paid too
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much attention to the role of language in child development to the
detriment of the attention paid to the role of the tool (cf. Bühler's
epigraph at the beginning of this paper). One need not fully agree with
this criticism (Vygotsky was at times very explicit about the material
connectedness of words) to see that judging by the present account of
some roots of Vygotsky's thinking it was at least partially correct in the
sense that the emphasis in Vygotsky's conception of the role of culture
and language in child development was different from that of his
contemporary and later activity theorists such as Leont'ev.
Conclusions
What, then, can we conclude as to the concept of culture which
Vygotsky used in his scientific thinking? With Humboldt, Potebnya,
Shpet and others Vygotsky believed that the study of language is of the
utmost importance for our understanding of (developmental) psychol-
ogy. This led him to undertake the study of the development of speech
and language in child development and to posit that the cognitive and
emotional development of the child is to a great extent determined by
the conceptual changes that the child's thinking undergoes. In Vygot-
sky's principal works the word 'culture' is equivalent to the concepts
or word meanings (rather than cultural practices) existing in that
culture. In his view the various conceptual systems existing in dif-
ferent cultures could be rank-ordered with the academic (abstract),
scientific systems of concepts at the top. This allowed him to say that
both adult people from non-western cultures and western children
should be introduced to the western-type academic conceptual system,
which would cause a progressive shift in their thinking. In his view,
then, cultural (and individual) progress was linked to the introduction
to certain ways of conceptualizing reality. Vygotsky was thus no
cultural relativist but a theorist who emphasized the way word
meanings within a certain society shape our view of reality.
Vygotsky's concept of culture is powerful but limited and biased. It
is powerful in that it allows us to explain the way individuals master
the linguistically mediated aspects of their cultural heritage and the
way they are changed in that process. It is limited because it is less fit
to explain the innovation of culture by individuals (cf. Van der Veer &
Valsiner, 1991) and the transmission of presumably non-linguistically
mediated aspects of culture such as the (culturally variable) critical
distance between individuals and body odour (Hannigan, 1995). It is
biased in the sense that it capitalizes on abstract, de-contextualized
thinking and regards other ways of thinking as lower or less developed.
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